justified in the Islamic State's official English-language magazine Dabiq. In other words, the Islamic State is explicit in seeking to emulate what it considers to be its historical predecessors.
The ghazis are, therefore, important to the Islamic State as a model of what historical Islamic holy warriors and an Islamic polity built on warfare (a ghazi state) were like, which can be emulated as part of their stated goal to live and fight in the manner of the early Muslims.
Ghazwa has its roots in pre-Islamic Arabia where the nomadic Bedouin tribes fought wars of raid and counter-raid. This sort of low-level warfare was well suited to their tribal structure, nomadic way of life, and a culture which celebrated heroism in battles; the practice even continued into the modern world in some places. 7 To be a ghazi was simply to be a raider. As an Arab, albeit originally a merchant, the Prophet Muhammad was fully acquainted with this style of warfare, and when wars broke out following his proselytisation of Islam, it was often in this manner which he fought; his very first success in his war against the Meccans was a raid by ten men on a caravan guarded by four. 8 One of the earliest genres of biography recounting the events of the Prophet Muhammad's life was even called al-maghazi (the stories of raids). 9 Islam gave these raids a higher purpose and direction but did not fundamentally change the way in which these were conducted. Although most discussion of Islamic warfare deals with jihad (struggle; either an internal spiritual one or an external military one), the difference between this and ghazwa is imprecise. 10 Some Islamic scholarship does make a distinction though between jihad, which is incumbent upon the whole Muslim population, and ghazwa, which is a duty which can be done by a select minority of Muslims. 11 However, in practice, the two are often confused. 12 Therefore, the difference between the mujahid (one who struggles) and the ghazi (one who raids) is also difficult to discern; often both terms can be applied to the same individual.
The first Islamic ghazis were, therefore, the companions of the Prophet Muhammad, who fought with him in his wars against Christians, Jews, and pagans. Following his death, they went on to fight the ridda (apostasy) wars over the leadership and beliefs of the nascent Islamic community. Before his death, the Prophet Muhammad had begun preparations for large raids against the Eastern Roman (Byzantine) and Persian empires which dominated the Middle East in Late Antiquity. 13 With internal threats quelled, the Muslims embarked on the futuh (opening), better known in the West as the Arab Conquests, which began with probing raids and ended with fullscale battles that culminated in the conquest of large areas of territory and the establishment of the first in a series of Islamic empires. Throughout this period, Islamic warriors moved near seamlessly from raiding to battles and sieges.
Over time, the pace of the Arab Conquests slowed, and the Muslims found themselves ruling over complex urban or settled rural civilisations with majority non-Muslim populations and which had powerful empires on their borders that wished to regain their lost territory. These long border areas shared with hostile non-Muslim powers were called the thugur. 14 These borders remained in a constant state of low-level warfare, with skirmishes and raids on both sides for the ghazis to fight in. As the borders changed with the arrival of newly converted tribes and the conquest of new territory, these ghazis began to gain real political power and even to establish ghazi states: powerful border polities based on holy violence. The Osmanli or Ottoman Turks are the most famous example of such a ghazi state 28 although there is a great deal of controversy about the use of this description. 29 As with the Arab Conquests though, their success ended up changing the structure and focus of the polity. As the Ottomans conquered more territory and expanded away from their Anatolian heartland, they began to adopt aspects of the urban civilisations they now ruled and the nomad-inspired warfare began to recede in importance compared to their centralised military. Their capture of Constantinople in 1453 A.D. essentially ended the Eastern Roman Empire which had been the primary foe of the ghazis since the early days of Islam. With that, the great age of the ghazis was over, and they were subsumed into new states. Nonetheless, the cultural influence of the ghazis remained strong. The historical epithet sahib ghazw can be understood to mean one who is a master of the literary genre of maghazi or one who fights as a ghazi. 30 This combination of culture and combat ensured the survival of the ghazi influence within Islam even though the original ghazi warriors and states had gone. This culture has its roots in the pre-Islamic ayyam al-Arab (battle days) poetry, in which the Bedouin nomads celebrated the martial heroics of their tribal raids. 31 With the conversion of these tribes to Islam, a new spiritual dimension was added to these stories, which made them part of an overarching religious narrative. The events of the Arab Conquests were, therefore, retold in these stories to become part of "a series of monumental episodes that located contemporary Islam and its adherents within an overarching narrative of prophesy, revelation and salvation." 32 The Muslim historians collected these heroic stories as akhbar (short narrative segments), which were then incorporated into larger historical narratives. 33 In these stories, certain topos appear regularly, like prebattle meetings in which poor but devout Muslim warriors symbolically reject highly desirable offers of material goods or friendship made by non-Muslim enemies before going on to defeat them in battle. 34 These topos served both a heroic and a It is not surprising, therefore, that this ghazi culture has also had a profound influence on the Islamic State in its self-identity, its tactics and also in its media releases:
30 Bonner, "Some observations concerning the early development of Jihad on the Arab-Byzantine frontier," 14. [I]t is frequently the case that individuals develop an understanding of their own place in the cosmos by imagining themselves as actors in an ongoing narrative, one which by its nature links the present to an earlier series of events, in relationship to one another.
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In placing the Islamic State's current battles as part of a larger Islamic historical narrative, the Islamic State's propagandists are laying claim to a historical-religious tradition that includes the ghazis. In doing so, they seek to legitimise and inspire themselves. As with other aspects of their Salafist theology, they seek to emulate the early Muslims to the extent that they depict their foes as also emulating or representing their historical enemies. literature which praised the deeds of the Caliphs and companions of the Prophet and held them up as an example to be followed. The criteria for praise then and now are essentially the same: piety and bravery.
Thus, we read of the likes of Anwar Najib al-Sha'ri (aka Abu Hassan al-San'ani), a mujahid who came to Iraq from Yemen. Originally, he had trained as an assistant dentist, but he travelled to Iraq and fought during the Second Battle of Fallujah, where he was captured. After two years in the Badush prison in Mosul, he was freed during a raid and returned to jihad, becoming a specialist with the mortar in many "battles and raids." His good nature and desire to marry are attested to.
After the death of a friend, he sought martyrdom and achieved it, alongside yet another friend, during a raid on a checkpoint. 53 Throughout, the emphasis is on both his military and his religious virtues, with his involvement in several raids noted. The intent of the author is clearly to attest to the virtues of the martyr and to use him to inspire others; this is why he is a prominent martyr of the title.
That the Islamic State deliberately seeks to emphasise these heroic elements is obvious from journalistic exposes of its media operations. An interview with an imprisoned Islamic State defector in the Washington Post revealed that Islamic State media teams arranged battlefield death scenes, washing away dried blood, lifting the corner of the mouths of dead mujahideen so that they were smiling (often seen as a sign they are in Jannah or Paradise) and raising their index fingers (a gesture which testifies to tawheed or the oneness of God). 54 The video "The Hollywood Reality of al-Baghdadi's Group," produced by an al-Qaeda-linked group, featured another Islamic State defector revealing how a propaganda video he starred in was faked; careful editing enabled them to falsify combat footage, whilst a raid on a Houthi outpost was staged with Islamic State mujahideen pretending to be dead with the help of Vimto for blood.
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That this celebration of religious-military heroism is rooted in the past can be seen from the language used in media releases. Thus, a popular, and deliberately archaic, description of Islamic State soldiers within its media is fursan (knights), leading to descriptions like, "They were ten from the best of knights, led by our knight, the Wali Hudhayfah al-Battawi" in one Islamic State article. 56 Another article extols the virtues of ribat for religious and military reasons, using historical and theological examples to make its case. 57 Over and over again, the Islamic State is compared to the early Muslim state and its mujahideen to the early Islamic warriors like the ghazis. 58 Terrorist attacks, like the 7/7 bombings, are described as ghazwa raids. 59 The video it has been their use of videos which has had the greatest impact and which bears the closest resemblance to the ghazi stories. Like them, they are often heroic narratives dealing with a single event which combines religious and military themes. They usually follow an almost-poetic rhythm: a tease to excite the viewer, then the preparations of the mujahideen, the firing of long-distance weapons at the enemy, the combat itself, heroic actions of individual mujahideen (such as suicide bombings, martyrdoms, or getting close to the enemy), and then the conquest of the enemy, often with looting or execution of prisoners. 65 Their execution videos are also as subversive as the topos of the ghazi stories were: like the topos which showed poor Muslims triumphing over powerful Romans and Persians, the execution videos show humbled Westerners at the hands of Muslims. 66 In both cases, the individuals are transformed via the story into the living embodiments of their different polities; the murder of an American hostage at the hands of his Islamic State captor demonstrates the powerlessness of the United States to save him and also serves as an act of qisas (retributive justice).
These videos also show an aspect of the Islamic State which mirrors that of the ghazis. Like them, the mujahideen of the Islamic State are drawn from numerous different groups, many of whom have made hijrah (migration) to join it. 67 The Islamic State offers a unity of coreligionists and a revolutionary universalising mission to conquer the world drawn from early Islam to counteract any possible friction. 68 The greatest similarity between the ghazis and the Islamic State though lies in the way in which they wage war. The classic ghazis were usually light cavalry formed of a mix of warriors from across the Muslim world, who were organised around their border ribat and led by charismatic leaders; their tactics emphasised raid and counter-raid, the use of deception, and manoeuvre. decentralized detachments to fashion a creative, bold and mobile force," 70 and the similarity is clear. They have swapped the war horse for the Toyota Hilux and the sword for the gun without changing the tactical mindset.
The Islamic State is above all else tactically aggressive to the extent that it has been described as suffering from a "cult of the offensive." 71 Individual units are, therefore, often afflicted with a "tactical restlessness," 72 which leads them to take aggressive action at all times; rather than defend the front line in ribat, they constantly patrol the contested territory between the two sides and often make small raids on opposing forces, seeking to overwhelm isolated units or camps. 73 Similarly, when they suffer reverses, their response is often to launch immediate counter attacks in an effort to overwhelm victorious but tired enemy forces before they can secure their newly won territory. This aggression also has the side effect of providing good footage for the Islamic State's propaganda videos that fit its "winner's messaging" 74 and its frequent boast to be "remaining and expanding." This has become particularly clear over the last 12 months, during which the Islamic State has lost large areas of territory and been on the strategic defence 75 but continued to largely release videos that focus on its offensive operations.
Islamic State units are able to do this because of the manoeuvrability of their forces and the tactical freedom given to junior commanders. Islamic State units typically operate in small "war bands" of between fifteen and fifty mujahideen with several light vehicles. 76 Operating out of the desert rather than the cities, they can attack in individual war bands or come together in larger confederations with the assistance of more specialised mujahideen for larger operations such as the seizure of Ramadi. 77 As the war bands are usually able to transport all their mujahideen in their own or in captured vehicles, they have great manoeuvrability; they can feint at their enemies, surround them and attack from multiple directions. 78 In addition, night attacks and the use of weather conditions like fog and sandstorms enable them to out-manoeuvre and surprise their enemies. 79 Individual commanders are given a relatively high degree of freedom, which enables them to improvise and act on their own without instructions from their strategic commanders. 80 In contrast, the Islamic State has fared poorly on the defensive. Its main defensive battle was the city of Kobane (Ayn al-Islam), in which it suffered heavy casualties and the loss of several important tactical commanders. 81 Trapped in restrictive urban combat which fixed them under the bomb sights of Coalition aircraft, they were unable to make use of the manoeuvre tactics which had succeeded so well for them before. This was unlike the fall of Ramadi where the Islamic State's use of inghimasi (commandos equipped with suicide vests) and ishtihadi (suicide fighters driving vehicles that have been turned into bombs) units to break the enemy quickly has enabled it to achieve a rapid victory. 82 Without that, the Islamic State in Kobane found itself drawn into an attritional battle it lacked the numbers for. Instead, the Islamic State generally prefers to withdraw its mujahideen into the desert, leaving behind only a small remnant to harass its enemies through sniper fire, improvised minefields, and ambushes. 83 This sort of strategic withdrawal was regularly practiced by the ghazis. 84 Another effect of these defensive battles is to destroy the urban areas involved and render them into ghost towns. This has been the fate of Kobane, 85 Tikrit, 86 and Ramadi. 87 In doing so, the Islamic State has created something like the "decapitated landscape" 88 created by the ghazis, depopulated and despoiled, which allowed them to build their ghazi states on the ruins. 89 This is a deliberate strategy on the part of the Islamic State going back to its founder Abu Musab al-Zarqawi who sought to create tawwahush (chaos) in order to disorder the state and prevent it from gaining the stability which would give it the strength to destroy his group. 90 By creating a zone of wilderness -like the thugur borders of the ghazis -the Islamic State is able to create the space for the group to exist and fight. 91 Although the influence of the ghazis on the Islamic State's tactics cannot be directly proven, there are enough similarities to suggest the influence of the former on the latter. The Islamic State sees itself as attempting to return to an earlier, purer Islam based on its understanding of early Islamic history. As the ghazis were a major part of that era, this means referencing and even imitating the ghazis to at least some degree; certainly, the Islamic State celebrates ghazi heroes, whilst the culture and theology of the Islamic State is replete with overt and nonovert emulation of the ghazis. Although the Islamic State is not identical to the classical ghazis or any of their successors, the historical influence of the ghazis on them is clear.
